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Research involving event-related brain potentials has revealed that anxiety is associated
with enhanced error monitoring, as reflected in increased amplitude of the error-related
negativity (ERN). The nature of the relationship between anxiety and error monitoring is
unclear, however. Through meta-analysis and a critical review of the literature, we argue
that anxious apprehension/worry is the dimension of anxiety most closely associated with
error monitoring. Although, overall, anxiety demonstrated a robust, “small-to-medium”
relationship with enhanced ERN (r = −0.25), studies employing measures of anxious
apprehension show a threefold greater effect size estimate (r = −0.35) than those utilizing
other measures of anxiety (r = −0.09). Our conceptual framework helps explain this more
specific relationship between anxiety and enhanced ERN and delineates the unique roles
of worry, conflict processing, and modes of cognitive control. Collectively, our analysis
suggests that enhanced ERN in anxiety results from the interplay of a decrease in
processes supporting active goal maintenance and a compensatory increase in processes
dedicated to transient reactivation of task goals on an as-needed basis when salient events
(i.e., errors) occur.
Keywords: anxiety, error monitoring, error-related negativity, conflict monitoring, cognitive control, event-related
potential (ERP), meta-analysis, worry
INTRODUCTION
Anxiety is a common human experience characterized by a variety
of symptoms, includingworrisome thoughts, physiologic arousal,
and strategic avoidance behaviors (Barlow, 2002). It generally
serves an adaptive response to threat by motivating organisms
to increase their vigilance and thus respond more effectively to
threats (Marks and Nesse, 1994; Barlow, 2002). Excessive and
persistent anxiety, however, represents one of the most prevalent
mental health problems in the United States (Kessler et al., 2005,
2012; Kroenke et al., 2007) and elsewhere (e.g., Collins et al.,
2011 for a review). Research from diverse literatures indicates
that cognitive deficits represent a core aspect of the pathological
anxiety that is associated with impairments in personal function-
ing (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; Eysenck et al., 2007;
Beilock, 2008; Sylvester et al., 2012). Better understanding the
associations between anxiety and cognitive deficits is therefore of
great importance for helping to address problems stemming from
pathological anxiety.
One especially active area of neuroscience research aimed at
tackling this issue has focused on how anxiety is related to error
monitoring. Error monitoring concerns the signaling and detec-
tion of errors in order to optimize behavior across a range of tasks
and situations, and this monitoring function is therefore a funda-
mental component of behavioral regulation. A growing body of
research indicates that anxiety is associated with enhanced ampli-
tude of the error-related negativity (ERN) of the human event-
related brain potential (ERP), suggesting that anxiety is associated
with exaggerated error monitoring (Olvet and Hajcak, 2008).
Anxiety is not a monolithic construct, however. Researchers
and laypersons alike use the term “anxiety” to refer tomany differ-
ent states and traits such as “stress,” “fear,” “worry,” among others
(cf. Barlow, 2002). This confusion contributes to difficulties with
describing the nature of the relationship anxiety has with error
monitoring, and the ERN, more specifically. Nonetheless, many
agree that there is a useful distinction between anxious apprehen-
sion on the one hand and anxious arousal on the other (Nitschke
et al., 2001; Barlow, 2002). Anxious apprehension is defined by
worry and verbal rumination elicited by ambiguous future threats
whereas anxious arousal is defined by somatic tension and physi-
ological hyperarousal elicited by clear and present threats. We and
others have recently suggested that the ERN is more closely asso-
ciated with anxious apprehension than anxious arousal (Moser
et al., 2012; Vaidyanathan et al., 2012; Weinberg et al., 2012b).
The purpose of the current review is to expand on this
argument in two important ways: (1) by conducting the first
large-scale test of this hypothesis using meta-analysis, and (2)
by providing a detailed conceptual framework that can be
used to generate mechanistic hypotheses and guide future stud-
ies. Regarding the latter, we leverage four key findings about
anxiety and cognitive control: (1) anxious apprehension/worry
is significantly involved in cognitive abnormalities in anxiety;
(2) anxious performance is characterized by processing ineffi-
ciency; (3) enhanced ERN in anxiety is observed without cor-
responding deficits in task performance; and (4) individuals
with chronic anxiety exhibit enhanced transient “reactive” con-
trol but reduced preparatory “proactive” control. We used these
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findings to develop a new compensatory error monitoring account
of enhanced ERN in anxiety. Specifically, we suggest that the
enhanced ERN observed in anxiety results from the interplay
of a decrease in processes supporting active goal maintenance,
because of the distracting effects of worry, and a compen-
satory increase in processes dedicated to transient reactivation
of task goals on an as-needed basis when salient events (i.e.,
errors) occur. The overall format of this integrative review follows
that of others in the literature by incorporating both empiri-
cal and theoretical considerations throughout the narrative (e.g.,
Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Shackman et al., 2011; Yeung et al.,
2004).
THE ERROR-RELATEDNEGATIVITY (ERN)
The ERN is an ERP component that reaches maximal amplitude
over frontocentral recording sites within 100ms after response
errors in simple reaction time tasks (See Figure 1; Falkenstein
et al., 1991; Gehring et al., 1993; see Gehring et al., 2012 for
a review). Converging evidence suggests the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) is involved in the generation of the ERN. More
specifically, the dorsal portion of the ACC (dACC) or midcin-
gulate cortex (MCC; Shackman et al., 2011) appears particularly
important to the generation of the ERN (Gehring et al., 2012).
The dACC/MCC has neuronal projections extending to motor
cortex, lateral prefrontal cortex, parietal cortex, basal ganglia, and
emotional centers such as the amygdala, suggesting that it serves
as a “central hub” in which cognitive and emotional information
is integrated and utilized to adaptively adjust behavior (Shackman
et al., 2011). It is important, however, to distinguish between the
ERN and dACC/MCC activity, as the ERN is a scalp-recorded
potential that has several possible sources in other regions of cor-
tex, including lateral prefrontal, orbitofrontal, and motor cortices
(Gehring et al., 2012).
The confluence of cognitive and emotional processing within
the dACC/MCC has contributed to disagreements among
researchers regarding the functional significance of the ERN. To
FIGURE 1 | ERN Waveform and Voltage Map. Neural activity recorded in
the post-response period during a flanker task. Response-locked waveform
is presented on the left. Dashed line: the ERN is shown as the negative
deflection peaking at approximately 50ms; the ERN is followed by a broad,
positive deflection—the error-positivity. Solid line: the CRN is the
correct-response counterpart to the ERN. It shows a similar time course
and scalp distribution. A voltage map depicting the scalp distribution of the
ERN is presented on the right. It shows that the ERN is primarily a
fronto-centrally maximal negativity.
date, however, the two dominant models of the function signifi-
cance of the ERN are the conflict monitoring (Yeung et al., 2004)
and reinforcement learning (Holroyd and Coles, 2002) theories.
The conflict monitoring theory suggests the ERN reflects detec-
tion by dACC/MCC of the co-activation of mutually exclusive
response tendencies; the erroneous response and the subsequent
error-correcting response activated immediately after error onset
(Yeung and Cohen, 2006). The reinforcement learning theory
suggests the ERN reflects the impact on dACC/MCC of a phasic
dip in midbrain dopamine release whenever outcomes are worse
than expected. This mechanism ultimately trains the dACC/MCC
tomaximize performance on the task at hand (Holroyd andColes,
2002). These theories have both garnered support in the litera-
ture, and more inclusive “second generation” models have been
proposed to incorporate both conflict monitoring and reinforce-
ment learning aspects (Alexander and Brown, 2011; Holroyd and
Yeung, 2012).
THE ERN AND ANXIETY
Numerous studies have noted that individual differences in anx-
iety are associated with increased ERN amplitude (for reviews,
see Olvet and Hajcak, 2008; Simons, 2010; Vaidyanathan et al.,
2012; Weinberg et al., 2012b). The most robust evidence emerges
from research on symptoms and categorical diagnoses of gen-
eralized anxiety disorder (GAD; Hajcak et al., 2003; Weinberg
et al., 2010, 2012a) and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD; see
Mathews et al., 2012 for a review)1. Because GAD and OCD are
largely characterized by worry and verbal rumination (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000; Barlow, 2002), we suggested that
this work is consistent with our thesis that the ERN is most
closely associated with anxious apprehension. Indeed, we directly
showed that the ERN was more strongly related to a measure
of anxious apprehension than a measure of anxious arousal in
a sample of female undergraduates (Moser et al., 2012). Hajcak
et al. (2003) demonstrated a similar effect such that the ERN was
enhanced in college students high in anxious apprehension but
not in students highly phobic of spiders. Other recent descriptive
reviews of the literature have come to a similar conclusion that
the ERN is aligned most consistently with anxious apprehension
(Vaidyanathan et al., 2012; Weinberg et al., 2012b).
AIMS OF THE CURRENTMETA-ANALYSIS
Despite evidence pointing to a specific association between
anxious apprehension and enhanced ERN, very few empirical
demonstrations of this specificity have been conducted. We aimed
to address this gap by employing meta-analysis to provide a
large-scale test of the hypothesis that anxious apprehension is the
dimension of anxiety most closely associated with enhanced ERN.
1It is important to note that all of these studies examined the relationship
between anxiety and the response-locked ERN, as previously defined. The
negative going ERP component elicited after negative feedback (i.e., feedback-
related negativity or FRN;Miltner et al., 1997) has been less consistently linked
to anxiety. In fact, some studies have noted attenuated FRN amplitudes in anx-
iety (Gu et al., 2010; Aarts and Pourtois, 2012; O’Toole et al., 2012 see Simons,
2010 for a review). Given that the majority of the anxiety research has exam-
ined the response-locked ERN, this component will constitute the focus of the
present investigation.
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Although our main focus for the meta-analysis is on the ERN,
we also report findings related to the correct-response negativity
(CRN). The CRN is a negative ERP component observed follow-
ing correct responses that has similar topography, morphology,
and perhaps functional significance to the ERN (See Figure 1;
Vidal et al., 2000, 2003; Bartholow et al., 2005). Some studies
have reported that anxiety is associated with enhancement in
overall negativity following responses, including both the ERN
and CRN, suggesting overactive response monitoring in general
(Hajcak and Simons, 2002; Hajcak et al., 2004; Endrass et al.,
2008, 2010; Moser et al., 2012). Thus, it is important to investigate
how anxiety is related to the CRN. Moreover, to isolate error-
specific activity from correct-related activity, we examined the
relationship between anxiety and the difference between the ERN
and CRN—i.e., the ERN (see Weinberg et al., 2010, 2012a).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
STUDY SELECTION
Published studies examining the ERN and anxiety were ini-
tially identified using theMEDLINE-PubMed andGoogle Scholar
databases using the terms “anxiety,” “OCD,” “GAD,” “obsessive-
compulsive,” “generalized anxiety,” “worry,” “action monitoring,”
“performance monitoring,” “conflict monitoring,” “error-related
negativity,” “Ne,” and “ERN.” Additional studies were identified
from the reference sections of the articles obtained from the
online searches and from contacting investigators for additional
unpublished datasets. This initial search yielded a total of 75
studies and datasets.
INCLUSION/EXCLUSION CRITERIA
Figure 2 depicts the study selection process used for the meta-
analysis. Studies were included in the current meta-analysis if
ERN data were reported and they included a measure that specif-
ically identified “anxiety” as the primary construct measured
(e.g., the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory—Trait Version; STAI-T)
or others tapping closely related constructs such as behavioral
inhibition (Behavioral Inhibition System scale; BIS). We did,
however, exclude studies in which anxiety was examined as sec-
ondary to a different primary psychopathology (e.g., secondary
anxiety to a comorbid primary alcohol use disorder; Schellekens
et al., 2010). Moreover, we focused on studies of the response-
locked ERN elicited in standard conflict tasks, such as the Eriksen
FIGURE 2 | Selection of studies. Flow chart depicting the selection of
studies used in the meta-analysis.
flanker task (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974), the Stroop task (Stroop,
1935), or variants of the Go/No-Go task. Beyond our motivations
described above, this decision is further justified by studies show-
ing that enhanced ERN is uniquely associated with OCD diagno-
sis and symptoms in such response conflict tasks (Nieuwenhuis
et al., 2005; Gründler et al., 2009; Mathews et al., 2012). We
excluded studies using trial-by-trial motivation manipulations.
Studies were also excluded if we were unable to compute a quanti-
tative estimate (i.e., effect size) of the relationship between anxiety
and the ERN. One study (Cavanagh et al., 2010) was excluded
because it reported a re-analysis of data that were included in the
final meta-analysis (Gründler et al., 2009; Study 2 Flankers task).
Because Moser et al. (2012) reported on a subset of the full sample
reported on in Moran et al. (2012) we only included the Moran
et al. (2012) study so as to include the full sample. Moreover, we
did not include the anxious arousal data fromMoran et al. (2012)
in the overall analysis, as the sample is entirely redundant with the
anxious apprehension data, but we did include it in moderation
analyses described below.
Using our inclusion/exclusion criteria, a total of 37 studies
were included in the present meta-analysis (see Table 1). The
selection of studies was nearly equally distributed among healthy
adult volunteer samples (19; 51%) and anxiety-disordered sam-
ples (16; 43%), with the remaining two studies using samples with
healthy children. Of the 37 studies, 27 (73%) used a version of
the Eriksen flanker task, 5 (14%) used a Go/NoGo task, 4 (11%)
used the Color Stroop task, and 1 (2%) used the Simon task.
There were a number of different self-report (and parent-report)
measures of anxiety used in the final selection.
OVERVIEW OF ANALYSES
For the present analysis, we used the varying-coefficient model2
recommended by Bonett (2008, 2009, 2010) and Krizan (2010)
because (1) it does not rely on the unrealistic assumptions
made by other fixed effects meta-analytic models (e.g., the exis-
tence of a single population effect size), (2) Bonett (2008, 2009,
2010) has demonstrated that varying-coefficient models provide
more precise confidence intervals than other models, and (3) it
performs well in the presence of correlation heterogeneity and
non-randomly selected studies (Bonett, 2008; c.f. Brannick et al.,
2011). Synthesizer 1.0 (Krizan, 2010) was used for computing
point estimates and 95% confidence intervals (95% CIs).
Pearson’s r was the focal effect size for all studies rather than
Cohen’s d as the former is more consistent with the idea that
anxiety is a continuous dimension rather than a distinct cate-
gory (Watson, 2005; Brown and Barlow, 2009). Cohen (1988)
suggested that rs ranging between |0.1|and |0.29|represent small
effects, rs ranging between |0.30|and |0.49|represent medium
effects and rs exceeding |0.50|are considered large effects. When
interpreting the results of the present analyses, it is useful to recall
that error-monitoring ERPs are negative deflections—that is, a
larger ERN is one that is more negative. Negative correlations
therefore indicate that greater anxiety scores are associated with
a more negative deflection whereas a positive correlation would
2See Appendix for converging findings using a random effects model.
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Table 1 | Characteristics of studies included in the meta-analysis.
Study Population Task Anxiety measure Type
Aarts and Pourtois, 2010a,b,c Volunteers Go/NoGo STAI-T M
Amodio et al., 2008a Volunteers Go/NoGo BIS AA
Beste et al., 2013a Volunteers Go/NoGo flanker ASI M
Boksem et al., 2006a Volunteers Letter flanker BIS AA
Carrasco et al., 2013a,b,c Pediatric OCD Arrow flanker K-SADS-PL AA
Carrasco et al., 2013a,b,c Pediatric OCD Arrow flanker K-SADS-PL AA
Carrasco et al., 2013a,b,c Pediatric anxiety Arrow flanker K-SADS-PL AA
Cavanagh and Allen, 2008a Volunteers Letter flanker BIS AA
Chang et al., 2010a Volunteers Letter flanker ASR M
Gehring et al., 2000a,c OCD Color stroop SCID AA
Gründler et al., 2009c Volunteers Letter flanker OCI-R AA
Hajcak et al., 2008c Pediatric OCD Simon Y-BOCS AA
Hanna et al., 2012a,b,c Pediatric OCD Arrow flanker K-SADS-PL AA
Inzlicht et al., 2009 study 1a Volunteers Color stroop BIS AA
Inzlicht et al., 2009 study 2a Volunteers Color stroop BFI-N M
Johannes et al., 2001a OCD Go/NoGo SCID AA
Kaczkurkin, 2013a,b,c Volunteers Letter flanker OCI-R AA
Ladouceuer et al., 2006c Pediatric anxiety Arrow flanker K-SADS-PL M
Larson and Clayson, 2011a,b,c Volunteers Arrow flanker STAI-T M
Larson et al., 2010a,b,c Volunteers Color stroop STAI-T M
Larson et al., 2011a,b,c Volunteers Arrow flanker STAI-T M
Luu et al., 2000a,c Volunteers Letter flanker PANAS M
Meyer et al., 2012a,b,c Pediatric anxiety Arrow flanker Parent-SCARED M
Moran et al., 2012a,b,c Volunteers Letter flanker PSWQ AA
Moran et al., 2012a,b,c Volunteers Letter flanker MASQ-AA M
Olvet and Hajcak, 2009a,b,c Volunteers Letter flanker DASS M
Olvet and Hajcak, 2012a,b,c Volunteers Arrow flanker BFI-N M
Rabinak et al., 2013a,b,c Veterans Arrow flanker SCID M
Riesel et al., 2011a,b OCD Arrow flanker SCID AA
Ruchsow et al., 2005c OCD Go/NoGo flanker SCID AA
Santesso et al., 2006a Pediatric OC Letter flanker CBCL-OC AA
Stern et al., 2010a,b,c OCD Letter flanker SCID AA
Tops and Boksem, 2011a,b,c Volunteers Letter flanker BIS AA
Weinberg et al., 2010a,b,c GAD Arrow flanker SCID AA
Weinberg et al., 2012aa,b,c GAD Arrow flanker SCID AA
Xiao et al., 2011a,b,c GAD Letter flanker Chinese MINI AA




Population Acronyms: GAD, Generalized Anxiety Disorder Patients; OCD, Obsessive-Compulsive Disordered Patients; OC, Obsessive-Compulsive.
Anxiety Measure Acronyms: ASI, Anxiety Sensitivity Index; ASR, Achenbach Self-Report; BFI-N, Big Five Inventory -Neuroticism; BIS, Behavioral Inhibition System
Scale; CBCL, Child Behavior Checklist (OC, Obsessive-Compulsive Scale); DASS, Depression Anxiety Stress Scale; K-SADS-PL, Schedule for Affective Disorders
and Schizophrenia for School-Age Children-Present and Lifetime Version; MASQ-AA, Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire: Anxious Arousal Subscale; MINI,
Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview; OCI-R, Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised; PANAS, Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; PSWQ, Penn State
Worry Questionnaire; SCARED, Screen for Child Anxiety Related Disorders; SCID, Structured Clinical Interview for DSM Disorders; STAI-T, State and Trait Anxiety
Inventory-Trait Version; Y-BOCS, Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale.
Type refers to Anxiety Type; AA, Anxious Apprehension (worry); M, Mixed anxiety.
Nine (24%) of the studies included in the current meta-analysis were also reported on in the Mathews et al. (2012) meta-analysis.
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indicate that anxiety is associated with a less negative deflection
(i.e., a smaller ERN).
We attempted to obtain data for all measures from all pub-
lished studies and known unpublished datasets, but complete
coverage was not possible in all cases. Thus, many of the follow-
ing analyses were conducted with subsets of the total number of
datasets.
The first set of analyses aimed to quantify the overall rela-
tionships between anxiety—broadly defined—and ERN, CRN,
and ERN. Effect sizes were computed across studies using the
reported associations between anxiety measures or groups and
the ERN. Most studies reported on a single anxiety-related mea-
sure or group. In some other cases, investigators included more
than one anxiety-related measure. In these cases, we chose the
anxiety-related measure that was most consistently used across
studies so as to maximize the potential for comparability across
studies.
The focal analyses tested the hypothesis that anxious appre-
hension is the dimension of anxiety most closely associated with
the ERN (as well as the CRN and ERN). To do this, we cre-
ated two groups of studies based on their measures of anxiety.
The first group was called the “anxious apprehension” group,
which included studies of GAD and OCD diagnoses and symp-
toms as well as studies of the BIS. Our decision to include the
BIS in the anxious apprehension group was based on four con-
siderations: (1) three of the seven items (42%) making up the BIS
measure used in ERN research include the word “worry” (Carver
and White, 1994); (2) a recent large-scale study demonstrated
that anxious apprehension (as measured by the Penn State Worry
Questionnaire; PSWQ) was nearly twice as highly correlated with
an avoidance motivation factor, including a measure of BIS, than
anxious arousal (as measured by theMood and Anxiety Symptom
Questionnaire—Anxious Arousal subscale; MASQ-AA; Spielberg
et al., 2011); (3) data from our own research team indicates that
anxious apprehension correlates three times as highly with BIS,
itself, than anxious arousal 3 and (4) existing theory that links
BIS to anxious apprehension and conflict between competing
responses (Gray and McNaughton, 2000; Barlow, 2002; Amodio
et al., 2008). The second group of studies was called the “mixed”
group, which included all other studies. Our reasoning for group-
ing all other studies together was that they involved non-specific
measures of anxiety-related constructs that often mix anxious
apprehension with anxious arousal (e.g., the Anxiety Sensitivity
Index; ASI) or combine anxiety with depression-related symp-
toms (e.g., STAI-T). To formally test our differential specificity
hypothesis, we compared the magnitude of the aggregated corre-
lation coefficients between the anxious apprehension and mixed
studies using Synthesizer software (Krizan, 2010).
RESULTS AND INTERIM DISCUSSION
See Table 2 for details of the results. Overall, we found that
anxiety—broadly defined—demonstrated a small to medium
association with the ERN and ERN. The CRN, however,
was not reliably associated with anxiety symptoms. Critical to
our focal hypothesis, we confirmed that anxious apprehension
was more strongly related to enhanced ERN than non-specific,
“mixed,” forms of anxiety-related symptoms (see Table 2). The
relationships between anxious apprehension and the ERN and
3In a sample of over 500 undergraduates, PSWQ was more than three times as
highly correlated with BIS (r = 0.65, p < 0.001, n = 531) than was MASQ-
AA with BIS (r = 0.21, p < 0.001, n = 526).
Table 2 | Results from the meta analysis.
Sample r n k 95% CIs rdiff 95% CIs−diff
ERN
Overall† −0.253 1757 32 −0.302; −0.203 0.253 0.153; 0.370
Apprehension −0.345 1077 20 −0.403; −0.285 – –
Mixed −0.093 826 13 −0.175; −0.009 – –
CRNa
Overall −0.063 1264 20 −0.129; 0.004 0.041 −0.086; 0.168
ERN
Overall −0.207 1437 26 −0.264; −0.148 0.247 0.132; 0.375
Apprehension −0.305 889 16 −0.374; −0.233 – –
Mixed −0.058 694 11 −0.150; 0.035 – –
aOnly one effect is presented for the CRN as no moderation was found (see Table 2).
Key:
r: aggregate effect size of association with anxiety.
n: is the total number of participants across all studies.
k: number of studies/samples.
95% CIs: 95% confidence intervals for the aggregate correlation (bold type indicates that the confidence interval does not include 0).
rdiff : difference between the aggregate effect sizes between anxious apprehension and mixed anxiety. 95% CIs−diff : 95% confidence intervals for the difference
(bold type indicates that the confidence interval does not include 0). Adjusting for three comparisons, these moderator analyses remain significant.
†In the initial analysis, we did not include the anxious arousal data from Moran et al. (2012) as the sample is entirely redundant with the anxious apprehension data.
When the anxious arousal data from are included, the ERN (r = −0.25, k = 33, n = 1903, 95% CIs: −0.30; −0.20) and ERN (r = −0.21, k = 27, n = 1583, 95%
CIs: 0.26; −0.15) continued to show significant associations with anxiety.
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FIGURE 3 | ERN forest. A forest plot depicting effect sizes (r ) between the
ERN and measures of anxiety for the meta-analytic average (top), the
anxious apprehension and mixed anxiety averages, and individual studies.
Error bars depict the 95% confidence interval for the effect size. The dotted
line indicates an effect size of 0.
ERN were medium in size whereas the relationships between
mixed anxiety and the ERN and ERN were quite small (rs
< 0.10). Results from individual studies for the ERN, CRN, and
ERN can be found in Figures 3–5, respectively. As can be
gleaned from the figures, the mixed anxiety studies were much
more variable in their effect sizes, with many studies showing
very large confidence intervals as well. Estimates of the CRN effect
sizes were likewise quite variable and, in all but one study, demon-
strated non-significant results. Together, these results support the
notion that the association between error-related brain activity
and anxious apprehension is robust whereas the association with
less specific forms of anxiety is significantly weaker. Moreover,
given the non-specific nature of the measures employed in the
“mixed” studies, it is also possible that any associations we
detected may, in fact, be driven by the anxious apprehension-
related items.
One concern is that nearly all studies conducted with patient
samples were included in the anxious apprehension group thus
potentially conflating the dimension of anxiety under study with
patient status 4. To address this issue, we tested moderation for
the ERN using non-patient studies; the mixed anxiety group con-
tained only a single patient study thus precluding our ability to
test moderation for the patient studies. After removing patient
studies, anxious apprehension studies (r = −0.301, k = 8; n =
410; 95% CIs: −0.400; −0.195) continued to show greater effect
sizes than mixed anxiety studies (r = −0.101, k = 12, n = 794;
95% CIs: −0.186; −0.016; rdiff = 0.199; 95% CIs for the dif-
ference: 0.064; 0.349). Therefore, the difference in effect sizes
between the anxious apprehension vs. mixed anxiety studies
cannot be accounted for by patient studies alone.
4We thank Editor Alex Shackman for pointing out this potential confound.
FIGURE 4 | CRN forest. A forest plot depicting effect sizes (r ) between the
CRN and measures of anxiety for the meta-analytic average (top) and
individual studies. Error bars depict the 95% confidence interval for the
effect size. The dotted line indicates an effect size of 0.
FIGURE 5 | ERN forest. A forest plot depicting effect sizes (r ) between
the ERN and measures of anxiety for the meta-analytic average (top), the
anxious apprehension and mixed anxiety averages, and individual studies.
Error bars depict the 95% confidence interval for the effect size. The dotted
line indicates an effect size of 0.
All told, the results of the current meta-analysis indicate that
anxiety, broadly defined, demonstrates a small to medium asso-
ciation with ERP indices of error monitoring. Most importantly,
the findings are consistent with the hypothesis that an enhanced
ERN is more strongly associated with the anxious apprehension
dimension of anxiety as opposed to other anxiety-related con-
structs. Specifically, associations between anxious apprehension
and ERN and ERN were more than three times as large as
those with other forms of anxiety 5. In contrast, anxiety showed
no reliable association with the CRN, irrespective of the way in
5With respect to the ERN, it is important to note that it includes variance
accounted for by the ERN and it is therefore difficult to discern whether its
association with anxiety is driven by variance attributable to the ERN itself.
Multivariate analyses are necessary to address this issue in future studies.
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which anxiety was operationalized. This finding provides criti-
cal information for developing mechanistic models of the links
between anxiety and error monitoring. Before detailing a con-
ceptual framework to understand these findings, however, it is
useful to point out caveats regarding the current meta-analysis
and present a few practical considerations for future research.
First, the current meta-analysis included a relatively small
number of studies. However, this is the first meta-analysis of its
kind and the total number of studies (N = 37) is in line with
previous meta-analyses of associations between psychopathology
and ERPs (e.g., Polich et al., 1994; Bramon et al., 2004; Mathews
et al., 2012). Second, the precision of effect size estimates will
also be improved if researchers collect larger samples than have
typically been used in this literature to date (sample sizes in the
current analysis were as low as n = 18; Median = 40, SD =
40.49), especially because most effect sizes in the social sciences
are relatively small (Cohen, 1988; Richard et al., 2003).
Third andmost importantly, the task of pin-pointing the asso-
ciation between type of anxiety and errormonitoring has received
limited attention in the literature. Most studies have taken a more
global approach by focusing on individuals with symptoms of
GAD or OCD, or by considering associations between relatively
generic anxiety symptoms and error monitoring ERPs. We are
aware of only two studies that have attempted to empirically
isolate specific relationships between facets of anxiety and error
monitoring: our recent study (Moser et al., 2012) showing that
anxious apprehension was more related to enhanced ERN than
anxious arousal and Hajcak and colleagues’ (2003) study show-
ing that high anxious apprehensive students showed enhanced
ERN compared to spider phobic students. With the current meta-
analysis we aimed to significantly extend this line of research.
However, because so little data exist that parse dimensions of anx-
iety in relation to the ERN, we had to create groups of studies,
many of which included overall measures that tap a variety of
anxiety-related constructs.
We acknowledge that we took a conservative approach to clas-
sifying the content of specific measures and compared studies
that used fairly clear measures of anxious apprehension—GAD
and OCD-related measures—to all others. It is evident from the
effect size estimates and figures that there is much more con-
sistency of positive findings in the studies using more precise
measures of anxious apprehension. Ideally, there would be more
studies directly comparing ERNmagnitudes across groups of par-
ticipants created using targeted instruments of different anxiety
constructs—e.g., anxious apprehension vs. anxious arousal. This
is a challenge we hope future research will undertake, as it is
not only important to the current topic but also to building a
more biologically informed rubric for mental disorder classifica-
tion (cf. Cuthbert and Insel, 2010; Sanislow et al., 2010). In this
way, our current analyses build on seminal work by Heller and
colleagues that has differentiated anxious apprehension from anx-
ious arousal across psychometric and physiologic studies (Heller
et al., 1997; Nitschke et al., 1999, 2001; Engels et al., 2007; Silton
et al., 2011; Spielberg et al., 2011).
In the next section, we use the results of this meta-analysis as a
starting point for building a conceptual framework to explain why
anxious apprehension/worry is the dimension of anxiety most
closely associated with enhanced ERN. In short, we propose a
compensatory error-monitoring hypothesis to explain the associa-
tion between anxiety and enhanced ERN. Our core claim is that
enhanced ERN in anxiety results from the interplay of a decrease
in processes supporting active goal maintenance, because of the
distracting effects of worry, and a compensatory increase in pro-
cesses (e.g., effort) dedicated to transient reactivation of task goals
on an as-needed basis when errors occur.
DISCUSSION
THE COMPENSATORY ERRORMONITORING HYPOTHESIS
Our conceptual framework is an extension of existing affective-
motivational models of the association between anxiety-related
constructs and enhanced ERN (Luu and Tucker, 2004; Pailing and
Segalowitz, 2004; Weinberg et al., 2012a,b). The foundation of
our account rests on four key findings about anxiety and cogni-
tive function: (1) that anxious apprehension/worry is significantly
involved in cognitive abnormalities in anxiety, (2) that anxious
performance is characterized by processing inefficiency, (3) that
enhanced ERN in anxiety is observed without corresponding
deficits in task performance, and (4) that individuals with anx-
iety exhibit enhanced transient “reactive” control but reduced
preparatory “proactive” control. We further incorporate the con-
flict monitoring theory of the ERN (Yeung et al., 2004) in order
to cast the anxiety-ERN relationship in more mechanistic terms.
The role of anxious apprehension/worry
The present proposal builds on our earlier explanation for why
anxious apprehension shows a particularly strong association
with enhanced ERN (Moran et al., 2012; Moser et al., 2012),
which in turn drew heavily on Eysenck and colleagues’ (2007)
Attentional Control Theory (ACT). ACT is a recent extension of
Eysenck and Calvo’s (1992) original Processing Efficiency Theory
(PET), which itself drew on Sarason’s (1988) earlier Cognitive
Interference Theory. What all of these theories have in common
is their emphasis on the deleterious effects of anxious appre-
hension on cognition. That is, all posit that distracting worries
interfere with the ability of anxious individuals to stay focused on
affectively neutral cognitive tasks. These early theories were sup-
ported by several studies showing the specific effects of worry on
cognitive performance (e.g., Morris et al., 1981).
ACT increased specificity of the earlier work by proposing
that anxiety is associated with a deficit in attentional control that
results from an imbalance in activity between the frontal goal-
directed attention system—concerned with goals and plans—and
the parietal stimulus-driven attention system—concerned with
salience and threat. Specifically, the ACT suggests that anx-
ious individuals are characterized by enhanced activity of the
stimulus-driven attention system and decreased functionality of
the goal-driven system. Anxious individuals are therefore tuned
to prioritize salient internal (e.g., worry) and external (e.g., angry
face) sources of potential threat at the expense of affectively-
neutral task-relevant stimuli. When no source of external threat
or distraction is present (e.g., during performance of a standard
conflict task) worry is distracting and likely to deplete goal-driven
resources. Our initial formulation of the anxiety-ERN relation-
ship (Moran et al., 2012; Moser et al., 2012) applied this common
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assertion that the worry component of anxiety is responsible
for cognitive processing abnormalities in affectively-neutral tasks,
using this idea to explain that this anxiety dimension, in particu-
lar, is most closely related to the ERN.
The notion that anxiety’s influence on cognitive performance
is primarily the result of the distracting effects of worry also
appears as the cornerstone of work by Beilock and colleagues
(Beilock and Carr, 2005; Beilock, 2008) who study relationships
between anxiety and academic performance. Beilock (2008, 2010)
suggests that worry co-opts available working memory resources
that would otherwise be allocated to the task at hand. Their work
has demonstrated that a variety of types of academic anxiety—
from math anxiety to spatial anxiety (Ramirez et al., 2012)—
impair performance because of worry’s drain on resources. Thus,
there is significant precedent from a variety of researchers for
focusing on the unique effects of worry on cognition in anxiety.
Anxiety is associated with processing inefficiency
As initially noted by Eysenck and Calvo (1992) in their seminal
review paper on Processing Efficiency Theory, anxious individu-
als often perform just as well as their non-anxious counterparts.
The reason performance is spared, they suggested, is that anx-
ious individuals employ compensatory effort because, although
worries are distracting, they also motivate anxious individuals to
overcome the negative effects of their anxiety on performance.
This dual-pathway compensatory effort idea helped to reconcile
inconsistencies in the literature regarding the effects of anxiety on
performance.
How did they come to hypothesize the role of compensatory
effort? First, Eysenck and colleagues showed that anxiety is often
related to longer reaction times, but intact accuracy, across a
range of reasoning, reading, attention, andworkingmemory tasks
(as reviewed by Eysenck and Calvo, 1992 and later again by
Eysenck et al., 2007). Thus, to achieve the same level of perfor-
mance accuracy seems to require anxious individuals to deploy
enhanced effort and processing resources that take longer to
implement. Second, their reviews showed that anxious individ-
uals also self-report using more effort on tasks in which they
perform at the same level as non-anxious individuals. PET and
ACT therefore suggest that anxiety is associated with process-
ing inefficiency—more effort or resources allocated to achieve
comparable level of accuracy—but not necessarily ineffectiveness
(i.e., low accuracy).
More recently, neuroimaging studies have provided additional
support for the claim that enhanced processing resources (com-
pensatory effort) help anxious individuals maintain typical levels
of performance (for a review see Berggren and Derakshan, 2013).
For example, enhanced dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activity was
reported on incongruent relative to congruent Stroop trials in a
sample of anxious college students (Basten et al., 2011). Similarly,
enhanced NoGo N2 was reported in anxious students despite
comparable performance to non-anxious students (Righi et al.,
2009). Berggren and Derakshan (2013) summarized a number
of additional consonant effects—i.e., greater processing resources
and compensatory effort revealed in anxious individuals despite
comparable behavioral performance –across a range of attention
and memory paradigms.
In addition, a recent neuroimaging study showed that anxi-
ety’s deleterious effect on math performance was curtailed to the
extent that high math anxious participants recruited frontal con-
trol brain regions (Lyons and Beilock, 2011). Thus, the impact
of anxiety on academic performance was mitigated by compen-
satory cognitive control—precisely as PET/ACT would predict.
There is therefore strong support for the notion that anxious indi-
viduals can perform as well as non-anxious individuals; however,
they draw on more processing resources and effort to do so.
Directly related to the ERN, processing inefficiency provides an
explanation for a curious finding from Endrass et al. (2010) who
showed that although non-anxious control participants demon-
strated an enhanced ERN during a punishment condition, OCD
patients did not. Specifically, ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007) predicts
that motivational manipulations should have minimal impact on
anxious individuals because compensatory effort is already being
employed during baseline performance whereas such manipula-
tions should cause increases in performance in non-anxious indi-
viduals because they allocate more effort to achieve the incentive.
Indeed, Eysenck and colleagues demonstrated this effect in early
behavioral work (as reviewed in Eysenck et al., 2007). In this light,
Endrass and colleagues’ (2010) results suggest that enhanced
ERN in non-anxious individuals during punishment reflected
increased compensatory error monitoring that was already at
ceiling in the OCD group during the standard condition.
Enhanced ERN in anxiety is observed in the absence of
compromised performance
Consistent with PET/ACT and the above-reviewed studies, anx-
ious individuals seem to demonstrate typical levels of perfor-
mance in the standard conflict tasks used in ERN studies. Yet,
they consistently show enhanced ERN. Indeed, only three indi-
vidual studies of the 37 included in the present meta-analysis of
the ERN reported a significant relationship between anxiety and
error rate. A binomial test suggests that this is consistent with a
5% false positive rate (z = 1.02, p = 0.16). Moreover, no individ-
ual study reported a significant relationship between anxiety and
reaction time.
To further evaluate this issue, we conducted an additional
meta-analysis on error rate and reaction time for those studies
reported on in our meta-analysis of the ERN. As we did with
the ERN, we first conducted the meta-analysis across all stud-
ies for which we could calculate effect sizes. Then, we conducted
moderation analysis by anxiety type. This analysis yielded no
significant relationship between anxiety (across all studies) and
error rate (k = 29; N = 1668; r = −0.02, 95% CIs: −0.08; 0.03).
There was, however, significant moderation by anxiety type such
that anxious apprehension was associated with lower error rate
(r = −0.08; 95% CIs: −0.15; −0.004) and mixed anxiety was
associated with non-significantly higher error rate (r = 0.08; 95%
CIs: −0.02; 0.18; rdiff = 0.16, 95% CIs for the difference: 0.04;
0.28). Both of these effects are notably small in magnitude. With
regard to overall reaction time, there was no significant effect of
anxiety (k = 26; N = 1480; r = -0.06, 95% CIs: -0.12; 0.002), nor
was there any significant evidence of moderation (rdiff = 0.09;
95% CIs:−0.05; 0.23). Together, these findings suggest the small-
to-medium association between anxiety (across all studies) and
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the ERN is observed in the absence of altered behavioral per-
formance. Importantly, the associations between error rate and
anxious apprehension and mixed anxiety unlikely contribute to
ERN effects, as they emerge as small effects and in opposing
directions for the two anxiety types.
Thus, in line with the notion that anxiety is characterized by
processing inefficiency, we suggest that enhanced ERN in anxiety
may index a compensatory effort signal aimed at maintaining a
standard level of performance (Moran et al., 2012; Moser et al.,
2012). That is, enhanced ERN related to anxiety reflects inefficient
error monitoring, in that anxious individuals may rely on greater
error monitoring resources to achieve the same level of perfor-
mance as non-anxious individuals. Together, then, we suggest that
the specific distracting effects of worry during affectively-neutral
conflict tasks requires anxious individuals to engage in compen-
satory effort to perform up to par, with enhanced ERN being one
index of this compensatory effort/greater utilization of processing
resources.
Anxiety is associated with enhanced reactive control, but reduced
proactive control
Braver (2012) and colleagues’ (Braver et al., 2007) dual mech-
anisms of control (DMC) model provides another compatible
context in which to understand the role of enhanced ERN as a
compensatory effort signal in anxiety. The DMC model suggests
that cognitive control is achieved through two distinct modes:
proactive and reactive. Proactive control—the more cognitively
taxing of the two modes—involves active maintenance of rules
and goals within lateral areas of prefrontal cortex in a preemp-
tive fashion to facilitate future performance. In contrast, reactive
control—the less effortful mode—involves allocating attention to
rules and goals on an as-needed basis, once a problem (such as
the occurrence of conflict or an error) has arisen. Furthermore,
Braver (2012) refers to reactive control as a “‘late correction’
mechanism” (p. 106) and links it to activity of the ACC, such that
ACC-mediated conflict monitoring may help individuals reac-
tivate task goals in a transient, as-needed fashion. The DMC
model is therefore immediately relevant to the current discussion
because it directly parallels the focus of ACT on the interac-
tion between goal-driven (or proactive control) and stimulus-
driven (or reactive control) attention systems (Eysenck et al.,
2007).
According to Braver (2012), non-anxious individuals are able
to alternate flexibly between reactive and proactive control modes
in accordance with changing task demands. In contrast, Braver
(2012) suggests that anxious individuals are distracted by wor-
ries that deplete resources needed for active goal maintenance,
thereby interfering with proactive control and throwing chron-
ically anxious individuals into a reactive control mode. That
is, anxious individuals rely more heavily on reactive control.
Increasing evidence supports this propensity for anxious individ-
uals to preferentially engage in reactive control (Gray et al., 2005;
Fales et al., 2008; Krug and Carter, 2010, 2012). For example,
Fales et al. (2008) showed that anxious individuals demonstrated
decreased sustained, but increased transient, activity in working
memory regions consistent with the notion of decreased proactive
and increased reactive control.
A recent study by Nash et al. (2012) showing that increased
behavioral activation system (BAS) activity, as indexed by left-
sided prefrontal EEG asymmetry, was associated with a reduced
ERN provides additional support for our proposed differential
effects of proactive and reactive control on ERN. Indeed, BAS has
been associated with proactive control and reduced dACC/MCC
activity (see Braver et al., 2007 for a review). Thus, while anx-
iety/BIS is associated with reactive control and therefore an
enhanced ERN—as demonstrated in our meta-analysis—BAS is
associated with proactive control and therefore a reduced ERN.
Formalizing the model using the conflict monitoring theory of
the ERN
We adopt the conflict monitoring theory of the ERN and its recent
extensions (Yeung and Cohen, 2006; Steinhauser and Yeung,
2010; Hughes and Yeung, 2011; Yeung and Summerfield, 2012) so
as to leverage a well-articulated computational model of the ERN
to help explain the relationship between anxiety and enhanced
ERN. According to the conflict monitoring theory, the ERN
reflects conflict that is detected when continued target processing
after an error leads to activation of the correct response, result-
ing in conflict with the error just produced. This notion is rooted
in the classic finding that individuals tend to automatically cor-
rect their mistakes as a result of continued stimulus processing
(Rabbitt, 1966; Rabbitt and Vyas, 1981). Thus, the ERN indexes
processes involved in the rapid correction of errors that reflects
the current level of cognitive demand or effort—i.e., the level of
response conflict (see also Hughes and Yeung, 2011; Yeung and
Summerfield, 2012). In the context of broader theories of the
ACC—the neural source of the ERN—the ERN provides informa-
tion about current conflicts in order to optimize action selection
and behavior (Botvinick et al., 2001; Botvinick, 2007). The con-
flict monitoring theory of the ERN nicely dovetails with the DMC
in that both suggest the ACC is involved in reactive control,
insofar as the ERN reflects ACC-mediated conflict monitoring
arising from activation of the error-correcting response (Yeung
and Summerfield, 2012)—i.e., a late correction mechanism.
Thus, our compensatory error-monitoring hypothesis of
enhanced ERN in anxiety first draws on the above reviewed
theory and evidence in assuming that anxiety increases sustained
attention to internal sources of threat (i.e., worry) thereby
reducing available resources dedicated to active maintenance of
task rules and goals. As a result, the anxious individual is forced
to rely on reactive control as a compensatory strategy. Critically,
when errors occur, reactive control causes an increase in stimulus
processing around and after the time of the incorrect response,
leading to enhanced conflict between the just-produced error and
the correct (target) response that gives rise to an enhanced ERN
(Yeung et al., 2004). Detection of this conflict could then help to
reactivate task goals in the moment and normalize performance in
anxious individuals (Braver, 2012). At least with respect to conflict
tasks, this dynamic seems to provide a mechanistic account of
an enhanced ERN in the presence of comparable performance
among anxious individuals, because the interactive effects of
reduced proactive control and increased reactive control would
cancel each other out at the behavioral level. Having detailed
our compensatory error-monitoring hypothesis, we now turn to
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new sources of evidence that provide additional support for our
claims.
New sources of support for the compensatory error-monitoring
hypothesis
Our compensatory error-monitoring hypothesis largely hinges on
two ideas: (1) that the cognitive load of worry begins a cascade
of processes that lead to enhanced ERN in anxious individuals,
and (2) enhanced ERN in anxiety reflects a compensatory atten-
tion/effort response. In this section, we present data from our
own lab that provides more direct support for these underlying
assertions of our model.
If enhanced ERN in anxiety results from the cognitive load
of worries on processing resources, it follows that experimen-
tally induced cognitive load should also lead to enhanced ERN.
Recent experimental data from our lab supports this notion
that cognitive load—an affectively-neutral analog to distract-
ing worries—enhances the ERN. In a study by Schroder et al.
(2012), we showed that the ERN is enhanced when stimulus-
response rules are switched, resulting in the need for individuals
to simultaneously inhibit old rules and maintain current rules.
We suggested that as a result of this need to juggle old and cur-
rent rules, a cognitive load was placed on subjects during trials
in which stimulus-response rules were switched. When errors
occurred, then, compensatory attentional effort was employed as
a reactive control strategy resulting in enhanced ERN.
More directly, we conducted an experiment examining the
effect of verbal working memory load (WML) on the ERN
(Moran and Moser, 2012), the details of which we present here.
Twenty-nine undergraduates (21 Female, M age = 19.52 years,
SD= 2.72) completed a flanker task interleaved with a successor-
naming task (for a similar method, see (Lavie and Defockert,
2005): Experiment 2). Prior to each flanker stimulus, participants
saw a string of five numbers to remember. Each five-number
string was either in numerical order (low WML) or in a ran-
dom order (high WML). Participants were instructed to mem-
orize these digits. Following each flanker stimulus, a memory
probe, which consisted of a randomly-selected number from the
five-number memory set, was presented and participants were
instructed to input the digit that followed the memory probe
digit in the memory set for that trial. The experimental session
consisted of 480 trials grouped into six blocks. Load was ran-
domly varied by block such that a given block contained only one
type of WML. There were an equal number of high- and low-
WML blocks. The ERN (and CRN) elicited by flanker errors was
calculated as the average activity in the 0–100ms post-response
time window relative to a −200 to 0ms pre-response baseline at
FCz. ERN/CRNs were then submitted to a 2 (Accuracy: Error vs.
Correct)× 2 (WML: High vs. Low) repeated-measures analysis of
variance (ANOVA).
Of key interest was the prediction that ERN amplitude should
be increased in conditions of increasedWM load. Themain effect
of accuracy [F(1, 28) = 39.54, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.59] confirmed the
presence of a clear ERN in this paradigm. Crucially, and consistent
with our hypothesis, theWML× accuracy interaction was signif-
icant [F(1, 28) = 9.69, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.28; See Figure 6 top right
panel]. The ERN was enhanced on high load trials [t(28) = 3.50,
FIGURE 6 | Working memory load enhances ERN. (Top Left) SWPs
elicited during the memory retention interval. (Top Right) Response-locked
ERPs as a function of accuracy and WML. (Bottom) A scatterplot depicting
the association between WM-related changes in SWPs and ERNs.
p < 0.01] whereas the CRN was unaffected by the WML manip-
ulation (t < 1). Moreover, the ERN-CRN difference wave was
greater on high WML trials than low WML trials [t(28) = 3.11,
p < 0.01].
To test the prediction that individual differences in sensitiv-
ity to load should correlate with changes in ERN amplitude,
we also correlated the ERN with a well-validated ERP index of
WM-retention. In particular, we measured the left-anterior pos-
itive slow-wave potential (SWP) that shows greater magnitude
on high- vs. low-WML trials (Ruchkin et al., 1997; Berti et al.,
2000; Kusak et al., 2000). By examining the relationship between
the SWP (WM-retention) and the ERN, we intended to provide
evidence that occupying WM functions under load, like worry,
directly leads to increased ERN. The SWP was computed across
the 500–3000ms post-stimulus window with respect to a baseline
consisting of the average activity in the 200ms window immedi-
ately prior to the presentation of the memory set. The SWP was
quantified as the average activity recorded at F3. SWPs were sub-
mitted to a single-factor (WML: High vs. Low) repeated-measures
ANOVA.
Consistent with previous work, high WML memory sets
elicited greater left-anterior positivity than low WML memory
sets during the rehearsal period [F(1, 28) = 18.21, p < 0.01, η2p =
0.39; see Figure 6 top left panel]. To directly link WM opera-
tions with the ERN, we first computed WM-related changes for
each of our measures: ERN was computed as the ERN-CRN
difference on high WML trials minus the ERN-CRN difference
on low WML trials—that is, the extent to which error-related
brain activity was modulated by the WML manipulation; SWP
was computed as the difference in activity between high and low
WML trials during memory-set presentation. We focused on the
ERN-CRN difference due to the significant Accuracy × WML
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interaction. However, if we compute ERN as the ERN on high-
WML trials minus the ERN on low-WML trials the interpretation
of the results does not change. Critically, findings revealed that
ERNwas strongly related toSWP (r = −0.51, p < 0.01) indi-
cating that enhanced ERN under high WML can be attributed
to increased WM operations during rehearsal (Figure 6 bottom
panel). Such data provide particularly strong causal evidence that
current cognitive load leads to enhanced ERN. Together, they pro-
vide a proof-of-concept for the notion that the enhanced ERN
that characterizes anxiety may result from WML imposed by
worry.
Regarding our assertion that enhanced ERN in anxiety reflects
a compensatory attention/effort response, we present results
from a novel analysis examining associations between anxious
apprehension, ERN, and academic performance—asmeasured by
grade-point average (GPA)—on a subsample of data from a larger
dataset (Moran et al., 2012). Past work has shown that larger ERN
amplitudes correlate with higher GPA, suggesting that enhanced
cognitive control is associated with higher academic achievement
(Fisher et al., 2009; Hirsh and Inzlicht, 2010). However, no studies
have examined whether anxiety moderates this relationship. We
predicted that if enhanced ERN in anxious apprehension reflects
a reactive compensatory control signal, a larger ERN in worri-
ers should be associated with higher GPA. Following this logic,
a low ERN in worriers would be associated with poorer academic
performance. If, on the other hand, the ERN is not related to com-
pensatory control in anxiety, the ERN-GPA relationship should
not differ as a function of anxiety.
We tested these predictions in 59 undergraduates (24 female,
M age = 20 years, SD = 3.20) who had useable cumulative GPA
data collected from the University’s Office of the Registrar. EEG
recording procedures and task descriptions have been described
elsewhere (Moran et al., 2012); participants engaged in a let-
ter flanker task and then completed the Penn State Worry
Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990). The ERN was cal-
culated as the average activity in the 0–100ms post-response
time window relative to a −200 to 0ms pre-response baseline
correction at FCz (where it was maximal) on error trials.
Consistent with previous work (Hirsh and Inzlicht, 2010),
larger ERN amplitude was significantly correlated with higher
GPA across the whole sample (r = −0.30, p < 0.05). However,
the relationship was small and non-significant among individuals
below the median on PSWQ scores (Low Worriers, n = 31; r =
−0.17, p = 0.37) but was significant and more than double the
size among those above themedian on the PSWQ (HighWorriers,
n = 28; r = −0.44, p < 0.05, see Figure 7). To explore further
the relationships between worry, ERN amplitude, and GPA, the
median scores on the PSWQ (Median= 51.00) and ERN (Median
= −4.42μV) were used to categorize participants into one of
four groups: Low Worry—Low ERN (n = 13), High Worry—
Low ERN (n = 16), Low Worry-High ERN (n = 18), and High
Worry—High ERN (n = 12). A one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with Worry-ERNGroup as the between-subjects factor
and cumulative GPA as the dependent variable revealed a sig-
nificant effect of Group [F(3, 58) = 3.17, p = 0.03]. This effect is
depicted in Figure 7. Fisher’s least significant difference proce-
dure indicated that participants in the High Worry-High ERN
FIGURE 7 | Relationship between ERN and GPA is moderated by worry.
(Top) Scatterplot showing the relationship between ERN and GPA in the
top 50% of the PSWQ distribution (black) and the bottom 50% (gray).
(Bottom) Bar graph depicting GPA as a function of ERN and Worry groups
which were created by median splits and described in the text. Error bars
represent standard error of the mean.
group had a significantly higher GPA (M = 3.32, SD = 0.53)
than the High Worry-Low ERN group (M = 2.83, SD = 0.51;
p < 0.05) and that the Low Worry-High ERN group (M = 3.31,
SD =0.61) also had a significantly higher GPA than the High
Worry-Low ERN group (p < 0.01). The difference between the
Low Worry-Low ERN group (M = 3.15, SD = 0.50) and High
Worry-Low ERN group was marginal (p = 0.10). Critically, the
High Worry-High ERN and Low Worry-High ERN groups did
not differ on GPA (p > 0.90).
Together, these exploratory analyses provide further evidence
that enhanced ERN among worriers functions as a compensatory
control signal insomuch as worriers with a large ERN achieved
the same GPA as non-worriers. In contrast, individuals with high
worry and a low ERN, suggesting a lack of effortful compensatory
control, tended to have significantly poorer academic achieve-
ment. Although preliminary, these findings are consistent with
the Lyons and Beilock (2011) study showing that anxiety’s delete-
rious effect on math performance was curtailed to the extent that
high math anxious participants recruited frontal control brain
regions.
PREDICTIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
To this point, we have provided theoretical rationale and empir-
ical evidence for our compensatory error-monitoring hypothesis
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of the association between anxious apprehension and enhanced
ERN. In this next section, we develop a set of additional predic-
tions and key avenues for future research to pursue.
The first, and perhaps most obvious, prediction for future
research to test is that inducing worry should lead to an enhance-
ment of the ERN. Borkovec and Inz (1990) have developed and
implemented a standard worry induction procedure for decades
that could be easily utilized in the context of an ERN study.
Previous anxiety inductions have demonstrated negative results
with regard to their effects on the amplitude of the ERN. For
instance, Moser et al. (2005) induced fear in spider phobic under-
graduates and showed no effect on ERN magnitude. Similarly,
Larson et al. (2013) failed to show an effect of an anxiety induc-
tion on ERN magnitude. Our prediction is that enhanced ERN
will only be elicited to the extent that anxious apprehension—
worry—is induced. The failure of existing studies to find effects
of anxiety induction on ERN may therefore be the result of their
use of anxious arousal inductions instead of worry inductions.
Similarly, we predict that worries captured at ERN testing
should relate to enhanced ERN and may mediate the associa-
tion between trait worry and enhanced ERN. Specifically, on-
and/or off-task worries could be measured following flanker
performance and related to the ERN. If worries during task per-
formance are responsible for co-opting goal-driven resources and
causing compensatory deployment of reactive control resources,
then such measures of worry should relate to enhanced ERN. The
Cognitive Interference Questionnaire (CIQ; Sarason and Stoops,
1978; Sarason et al., 1986) would be onemeasure of this construct
worth exploring in this regard. Self report and thought sam-
pling methods for measuring mind wandering and task-unrelated
thoughts (Matthews et al., 1999; Schooler et al., 2011; Mrazek
et al., 2011, 2013) would also be important for future tests of our
hypotheses.
Following from our formulations and the preliminary find-
ings of Endrass et al. (2010), we would also predict that incentive
and motivation manipulations should have less effect on ERN
amplitude in anxious than non-anxious populations. There are
numerous ways to manipulate incentive and motivation and thus
this effect could be tested in a variety of contexts. Previously,
Hajcak et al. (2005) showed that the amplitude of the ERN
was enhanced on trials that were worth more points toward a
monetary incentive as well as under a condition of performance
evaluation. We predict that such manipulations would not lead
to enhanced ERN in anxious individuals because they already
employ compensatory effort during baseline conditions.
Treatment studies not only offer the chance to help improve
anxious peoples’ functioning but also to test theory-derived
hypotheses. With respect to our view that the anxiety-ERN rela-
tionship reflects reductions in proactive control and compen-
satory increases in reactive control, one treatment possibility is
to train anxious individuals to adopt more of a proactive control
strategy. Proactive control training has been successfully imple-
mented in individuals with schizophrenia, resulting in decreased
symptoms and more proactive brain activity (Edwards et al.,
2010), as well as in older adults who tend to engage in reactive
control strategies before, but not after, training (Braver et al.,
2009; Czernochowski et al., 2010; Jimura and Braver, 2010). We
predict that proactive control training in worriers would result
in reductions in ERN magnitude that might also mediate the
effectiveness of the intervention in terms of symptom reduction.
Similarly, another possibility for testing our hypothesis comes
from Ramirez and Beilock’s (2011) recent demonstration that
emotional expressive writing improves test performance in high
test anxious individuals via its effects on reducing worries and
freeing up proactive resources for active goal maintenance. We
expect that expressive writing about worries would likewise result
in reduced ERN magnitude in highly apprehensive individuals.
A particularly exciting feature of this last set of predictions
concerning treatment effects on the ERN in anxious individuals
is that it provides a context in which to interpret broader effects
of anxiety treatment on the ERN. To date, one study in pedi-
atric OCD patients showed that the ERN did not change with
successful cognitive-behavioral treatment (CBT) of OCD (Hajcak
et al., 2008). This study has been cited as evidence for a “trait”
biomarker or “endophenotype” interpretation of enhanced ERN
in anxiety (e.g., Olvet and Hajcak, 2008). However, there seem
to be three problems with this conclusion: (1) despite symp-
tom reduction in the OCD patients, post-treatment scores still
placed them around the clinical cutoff for an OCD diagnosis, (2)
CBT is an intervention designed to reduce anxiety symptoms,
not alter underlying neural mechanism involved in cognitive
control (i.e., ERN), and (3) the study was conducted in chil-
dren and adolescents for whom the anxiety-ERN relationship
may be different than in adults (Meyer et al., 2012). In this
way, even though patients showed reduced OCD symptoms after
treatment, they still demonstrated anxiety-related compensatory
effort, as reflected in enhanced ERN. The focus of our predic-
tions is not on reducing anxiety symptoms per se, but rather
to change the functional relationship between worry and cogni-
tive functioning (cf. Ramirez and Beilock, 2011). For instance,
the purpose of the expressive writing intervention is to target
the mechanism involved in anxiety’s effects on cognition. This
approach will not only help test our predictions set forth here
but it may also inform treatments of anxiety and their impact on
performance.
The current framework provides an important link between
anxiety research and computational models of cognition. Thus,
we suggest that future research in this area (and in other allied
areas as well) apply computational modeling to test predictions
about the associations between anxiety and error-monitoring
ERPs and related performance measures. Yeung and Cohen
(2006), for instance, demonstrated the power of applying com-
putational modeling to understand ACC-mediated monitoring
deficits in lesion patients. Interestingly, they showed that reduced
ERN in patients with ACC lesions could be modeled as resulting
from impaired attention control rather than specific impairments
in conflict-monitoring per se. Applying this modeling technique
to the anxiety-ERN relationship, in particular by implement-
ing distinct proactive and reactive control modes in a single
model (e.g., De Pisapia and Braver, 2006), represents an exciting
direction for future research. This approach might help illumi-
nate whether anxiety affects ACC-mediated monitoring functions
directly, as envisioned in current theories that emphasize tight
linkages between control and affective functions in ACC (e.g.,
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Shackman et al., 2011; Hajcak, 2012), or rather has an indi-
rect impact through its effects on cognitive control modes (e.g.,
Braver, 2012), as suggested by our analysis.
This framework also provides the foundation for incorporat-
ing other conflict- and error-monitoring ERPs that have failed to
be adequately addressed by researchers primarily interested in the
anxiety-ERN relationship. Regarding the CRN, for example, the
results of the current meta-analysis suggest that it is not reliably
associated with anxiety, thus failing to support the notion of gen-
eral overactive action monitoring in anxiety (e.g., Hajcak et al.,
2003; Endrass et al., 2008). The error positivity (Pe)—a centro-
parietally maximal ERP that follows the ERN (See Figure 1;
Falkenstein et al., 2000)—is another error-monitoring ERP that
has received limited attention in the anxiety literature. The Pe
appears to index explicit error-related processing, including the
detection and signaling of errors (Yeung and Summerfield, 2012).
To date, research is equivocal, with some studies showing reduced
Pe (Moser et al., 2012), some showing enhanced Pe (Weinberg
et al., 2010) and still others showing no association (Weinberg
et al., 2012a) in anxiety. Again, such inconsistent findings argue
against a general impairment in error/action monitoring.
The N2, a fronto-central negativity observed around
250–350ms in the stimulus-locked ERP on correct trials, is a
relevant action-monitoring ERP that is purported to reflect
pre-response conflict elicited by the co-activation of correct and
incorrect responses when stimuli are associated with both (e.g.,
incongruent flanker stimuli; Yeung et al., 2004). Unfortunately,
the N2 is even more ignored than the Pe in anxiety research. Two
studies, not included in the current analysis because they did not
report ERN data, however, suggest enhanced N2 in trait anxious
college students (Righi et al., 2009; Sehlmeyer et al., 2010). If
enhanced N2 were to emerge as a reliable marker of anxiety in
future studies, it would suggest a more general effect of anxiety
on conflict monitoring (Yeung et al., 2004).
RELATED ACCOUNTS OF ENHANCED ERN IN ANXIETY
The major advance of our proposal is that it attempts to directly
account for the relationship between anxiety and the ERN.
Although there exist emotional-motivational accounts of the
ERN and its within- and between-subjects variation (Pailing and
Segalowitz, 2004; Weinberg et al., 2012b), nonemake specific pre-
dictions about the relationship between anxiety and the ERN.
Rather, existing accounts are much broader in their assertions
regarding the functional significance of the ERN and its varia-
tion across individuals. Nonetheless, to the extent that existing
emotional-motivational accounts can be applied to the anxiety-
ERN relationship, we next address how they fare with regard to
their ability to explain existing data.
Researchers have suggested that the ERN is an affective or
emotional response to errors (Luu and Tucker, 2004; Pailing and
Segalowitz, 2004), in large part because of associations noted
between the ERN and individual differences in emotional traits
like anxiety. According to this view, then, an enhanced ERN in
anxious individuals reflects their heightened negative emotional
response to or concerns over mistakes (Bush et al., 2000; Gehring
and Willoughby, 2002; Hajcak et al., 2005). Many earlier stud-
ies pointed to both heightened ERN amplitude and overactive
error-related ACC activity in anxiety as evidence of a dysfunc-
tional affective response to errors, particularly in individuals with
OCD (Gehring et al., 2000; Johannes et al., 2001). Functional
imaging evidence showing rostral ACC enhancement in response
to errors in OCD patients (Fitzgerald et al., 2005) was considered
strong support for this claim, as the rostral subdivision is often
considered the “affective/emotional” portion of ACC, as opposed
to the “cognitive” subdivision that lies dorsally (Bush et al., 2000).
A related conceptualization suggests that variation in the mag-
nitude of the ERN reflects individual differences in defensive
reactivity (Hajcak and Foti, 2008; Hajcak, 2012; Weinberg et al.,
2012a). That is, the ERN carries information aimed at mobiliz-
ing resources to protect the organism against subsequent negative
events, with this response being sensitive to individual differ-
ences in aversiveness of errors. These authors situate the ERN
in a broader network of defensive motivational systems involved
in executing a cascade of physiological, cognitive, and behavioral
responses when potential threats are detected (Lang et al., 1997;
Bradley et al., 2001; Bradley, 2008). In this view, the ERN is a neu-
ral marker of a broader neurobehavioral trait—that is, a stable
individual difference with identifiable referents in neurobiology
and behavior (Patrick and Bernat, 2010; Patrick et al., 2012)—of
defensive reactivity. Anxiety is included in this model as reflecting
individual differences in defensive reactivity thereby supporting
the theory’s primary contention.
Although the affective response and defensive reactivity mod-
els provide plausible accounts of heightened ERN amplitude in
anxiety, they only loosely address the fact that some forms of
anxiety are more closely tied to enhanced ERN than others. Our
conceptual framework, on the other hand, uses this distinction
as foundational for specifying the relationship between anxiety
and the ERN. There are also contradictory findings in the litera-
ture that point to additional weaknesses in current approaches to
conceptualizing the connection between anxiety and the ERN.
With regard to the affective response interpretation, the cogni-
tive vs. affective subdivision model of the ACC is not supported
by extant research (Shackman et al., 2011). Thus, it is unclear
whether enhanced rostral ACC activation following errors in
anxious individuals is indicative of an affective response per se
(cf. Poldrack, 2011 for problems with reverse inference in gen-
eral). Rather, as Shackman et al. suggest, such ACC activation in
anxious individuals may reflect a more domain general “adap-
tive control” response. Moreover, modulations of ACC activity
should not be conflated with those of the ERN given the poten-
tial for multiple sources to contribute to the generation of the
ERN (Gehring et al., 2012). Evidence from our own work fur-
ther demonstrates this point. Specifically, although ACC activity
is enhanced during symptom provocation in simple phobics (e.g.,
spider phobics; Rauch et al., 1995), we showed that the ERN is not
(Moser et al., 2005).
Regarding the defensive reactivity interpretation, evidence
speaking directly to the assertion that “. . . anxious individuals
who are characterized by increased ERNs may exhibit a greater
defensive response to errors compared with non-anxious indi-
viduals” (Hajcak and Foti, 2008, p. 106) is lacking. In fact,
Endrass and colleagues’ (2010) failure to show modulation of the
ERN by punishment in an OCD sample is inconsistent with a
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defensive reactivity account. If enhanced ERN in anxiety reflects
the aversiveness of errors, it stands to reason that the ERN should
have been enhanced during the punishment condition in the
OCD sample. That this result was not observed suggests the aver-
siveness of the error did not significantly contribute to enhanced
ERN in the OCD sample in either the baseline or punishment
condition. Riesel et al. (2012), on the other hand, did find that
punishment enhanced the ERN in high trait anxious individu-
als but not low trait anxious individuals. However, the authors
utilized the STAI-T, which we have shown here is not reliably asso-
ciated with enhanced ERN. Indeed, high STAI-T individuals in
the Riesel et al. study did not show enhanced ERN in the control
condition, only a larger enhancement of the ERN from the control
to punishment condition. Taken together, extant data are equivo-
cal as to the ability of the defensive reactivity account to explain
enhanced ERN in anxiety.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our overarching goal in this paper has been to provide a founda-
tion for future research addressing the relationship between anx-
iety and error processing, both quantitatively and conceptually.
In particular, we provide estimates of the effect sizes concerning
associations between dimensions of anxiety and error-monitoring
ERPs elicited in standard conflict tasks. This meta-analytic result
provides a more exact understanding of the previous literature
and can serve to help researchers design better studies for the
future with an eye toward statistical power and precision. We
have also articulated a framework that focuses on what enhanced
ERN reflects about cognitive dysfunction in anxiety. Our view
is that enhanced ERN in anxiety indexes the impact of anxious
apprehension—i.e., worry—on post-decisional response conflict
by way of its negative influence on active goal maintenance mech-
anisms and a resulting compensatory increase in “as-needed”
reactive control. Such a dynamic reflects what Berggren and
Derakshan (2013) call the “hidden cost” of anxiety. As has been
suggested, under simple task conditions, this compensatory effort
allows anxious individuals to perform as well as non-anxious
individuals. Unfortunately, compensatory effects can break down
when tasks become more difficult. That is, enhanced ERN pro-
vides an index of how hard a worried mind has to work to
complete even simple tasks. It can serve as a harbinger of strug-
gle and potential failure on more complex tasks and presumably
real-world adaptation. Indeed, the constant distraction and com-
pensatory re-focus is illustrative of how anxiety, and worry, in
particular, can drain resources and lead to functional disability.
In sum, we hope this model and our initial ideas for future
research represents just the beginning of a deeper understand-
ing of what error- and conflict-related ERPs can tell us about the
impact of anxiety on cognition. The promise of more formalized
models of cognitive dysfunction in anxiety will be realized to the
extent that they offer new insights into how better to identify and
treat the world’s most ubiquitous mental health problem.
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APPENDIX
Given that the varying-coefficient model—the basis for the analy-
sis presented in themain text—has rarely been applied in the pub-
lished literature, we also present results computed from a more
common meta-analytic framework. As these studies were rather
heterogeneous in their reported effect sizes, our second analy-
sis was conducted within the context of a random effects model
(Cumming, 2012). Point estimates, 95% CIs and heterogene-
ity statistics were computed using Comprehensive Meta-Analysis
software (v.2; Borenstein et al., 2005).
The results of this analysis are presented in Table A1. Overall,
these results closely mirror the findings from the main analysis.
As in the main analysis, both the ERN andERN showed signifi-
cant associations with measures of anxiety. Importantly, analyses
of the heterogeneity between data sets revealed that effect sizes
were significantly larger in studies examining anxious apprehen-
sion compared to mixed anxiety for the both the ERN andERN.
The results of this analysis diverge from those presented in the text
in two, relatively minor, ways: first, mixed anxiety no longer shows
a significant association with either the ERN or ERN. Second,
the CRN now shows a small, but significant, association with anx-
iety. As before, the CRN does not show moderation by anxiety
dimension group.
REFERENCES
Borenstein, M., Hedges, L., Higgins, J., and Rothstein, H. (2005). Comprehensive
Meta-analysis Version 2. Englewood, NJ: Biostat.
Cumming, G. (2012). Understanding the New Statistics: Effect Sizes, Confidence
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Table A1 | Results from the Meta-Analysis using the random effects model.
Sample r Lower limit Upper limit Q p
ERN
Overall† −0.254 −0.331 −0.173 8.95 0.003
Apprehension −0.329 −0.411 −0.241 – –
Mixed −0.110 −0.224 0.007 – –
CRN
Overall −0.059 −0.115 −0.002 0.88 0.358
ERN
Overall −0.195 −0.273 −0.115 13.05 < 0.001
Apprehension −0.275 −0.350 −0.197 – –
Mixed −0.043 −0.142 0.056 – –
Key:
r: aggregate effect size of association with anxiety.
Lower Limit/Upper Limit: The bounds for the 95% confidence intervals for the aggregate correlation (bold type indicates that the confidence interval does not
include 0).
Q: The heterogeneity statistic used to test for moderation between Anxious Apprehension and Mixed anxiety.
p: Significance for the Q statistic. Both the ERN and ERN continue to show significant moderation after adjusting for three comparisons.
†As before, we first conducted this analysis without the anxious arousal data from Moran et al. (2012). When these data an included, both the ERN (r = −0.247;
95% CIs: −0.321; −0.169) and ERN (r = −0.191; 95% CIs: −0.264; −0.116) continued to show significant associations with anxiety. The CRN, however, did not
(r = −0.046; 95% CIs: −0.099; 0.008).
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